
Jonathan A. Libgober
Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Southern California

I am an economist studying information and uncertainty.
My research focuses on:
- Learning in the presence of complexity or potential model misspecification
- Communication of credible or verifiable information
I am interested in both pure theory and applied questions.
I received my PhD in Economics from Harvard in May 2018. I have been at USC since 2019 and have held visiting positions at Columbia and Yale.
Curriculum Vitae
(Last update: May 3, 2026)
Publications
11. The Dynamics of Verification when Searching for Quality
with Zihao Li
Review of Economic Studies, Forthcoming
"Decreasing skepticism" characterizes optimal verification dynamics in a dynamic principal-agent project selection problem, where transfers cannot be used and quality can be verified at a (sufficiently low) cost.
[PDF] [Publisher's Website]
10. Research Registries and the Credibility Crisis:
An Empirical and Theoretical Investigation
with Eliot Abrams and John A. List
Economic Journal, Forthcoming
We evaluate the performance of research registries as a solution to the credibility crisis, focusing primarily but not exclusively on the AEA RCT Registry.
[PDF] [Publisher's Website]
9. Higher-Order Beliefs and (Mis)Learning from Prices
with Kevin He
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Forthcoming
We illustrate gains and losses from misperceptions of higher-order beliefs in a Cournot duopoly game.
Results from this paper originally appeared in Evolutionarily Stable (Mis)specifications: Theory and Applications.
[PDF] [Publisher's Website]
8. With a Grain of Salt:
Investor Reactions to Uncertain News and (Non)disclosure
with Beatrice Michaeli and Elyashiv Wiedman
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2026, 81(1): 101862
Uncertainty about whether external news is accurate creates an incentive for managers to delay disclosure decision. A consequence is that the market's expectation of firm value may worsen with better news.
[PDF] [Publisher's Website]
7. Retractions: Updating from Complex Information
with Duarte Gonçalves and Jack Willis
Review of Economic Studies, 2026, 93(1): 476–516
In a belief-updating experiment, we find that subjects underreact to information when it comes in the form of a retraction.
[PDF] [Publisher's Website]
6. Misspecified Learning and Evolutionary Stability
with Kevin He
Journal of Economic Theory, 2025, 230: 106082
We introduce a selection criterion on behavioral biases in environments with learning.
Results from this paper originally appeared in Evolutionarily Stable (Mis)specifications: Theory and Applications.
[PDF] [Publisher's Website]
5. Identifying Wisdom (of the Crowd): A Regression Approach
Journal of Political Economy: Microeconomics, 2025, 3(4): 798-826
Blackwell experiments can be determined via regression, and priors solve an eigenvector equation derived from this procedure.
[PDF] [Publisher's Website]
4. Learning Underspecified Models
with In-Koo Cho
Journal of Economic Theory, 2025, 226: 106015
We present a monopoly pricing algorithm which posits linear demand but identifies the optimal price even if demand is non-linear.
[PDF] [Publisher's Website]
3. Iterative Weak Learnability and Multiclass Adaboost
with In-Koo Cho and Cheng Ding
Proc. of the 30th ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, 2024, 466-477
We propose a procedure for multi-label classification problems based on iteratively eliminating worst-performing labels.
[PDF] [Publisher's Website]
2. False Positives and Transparency
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022, 14(2): 478-505
I study a model of costly communication with (partial) sender commitment and show how limited commitment can help the receiver.
[PDF] [Publisher's Website]
1. Informational Robustness in Intertemporal Pricing
with Xiaosheng Mu
Review of Economic Studies, 2021, 88(3): 1224-1252.
Constant price paths deliver the optimal profit guarantee when a seller does not know how buyers learn about a product.
[PDF] [Publisher's Website]
Working Papers
1. Sequentially Optimal Pricing under Worst-Case Information
with Zihao Li and Xiaosheng Mu (Last update: May 2026) Extended abstract at EC '25
We propose an approach to study informationally robust dynamic pricing when the seller lacks commitment.
2. Incentivizing Forecasters to Learn: Summarized vs. Unrestricted Advice
with Yingkai Li (Last update: April 2026) Extended abstract at EC' 24
We characterize when a designer, seeking to induce an agent to acquire information over time and able to condition rewards on outcomes, should simply elicit a single report after acquiring information.
3. Electric Vehicle Sharing and Adoption: Evidence from BlueLA
with Ruozi Song (Last update: March 2026) R&R at Journal of Public Economics
An Electric Vehicle (EV)-based ridesharing program in Los Angeles led to an increase in EV purchases. We argue information externalities are responsible.
4. Selecting Competing Proposals
with Peiran Xiao (Draft available upon request) To be presented at EC' 26
We study a mechanism design problem without transfers where conflict arises endogenously from competition between agents. Optimal mechanisms manage this conflict by combining upward distortions in project choice with selection handicaps that favor weaker agents.
5. Organization Design for Complex Worlds
(Draft available upon request)
I study how environmental complexity shapes organizational hierarchy. Volatility alone need not matter: local, jagged complexity favors hierarchy expansion, while broader correlated variation can lead to hierarchy contraction.
© 2026

